Old Folly in a New Disguise
Nation Building to Combat Terrorism

by Gary T. Dempsey

Executive Summary

Since September 11, 2001, there have been calls from various quarters to embrace nation building as a tool for combating terrorism. The logic behind the idea is that “good” states do not do “bad” things, so Washington should build more “good” states. That idea, however, relies on several dubious assumptions—for example, that embarking on multiple nation-building missions will reduce the potential for anti-American terrorism. If anything, nation building is likely to create more incentives, targets, and opportunities for terrorism, not fewer. The nation-building idea also draws on false analogies with the past. For example, some people assert that Europe’s experience under the Marshall Plan can be readily duplicated in a wholehost of countries and that, with enough economic aid, trained bureaucrats, and military force of arms, “bad” states anywhere can be transformed into open, self-sustaining, peaceful states.

In reality, combating terrorism is tied to the realist perspective, which says that it increasingly makes sense for states to use or condone violence, including terrorism, when they fall prey to the idea that violence will succeed. A realist approach to combating terrorism, therefore, does not hinge on nation building or making the world safe for democracy. It hinges on a policy of victory and credible deterrence. And if there is no competent government for the United States to deter? U.S. policymakers should understand that that is precisely where the terrorists are at their most vulnerable, because there is no power to protect them.
Introduction

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many authors, analysts, and politicians have claimed that the events of September 11, 2001, provide concrete evidence that the United States should incorporate "nation building" into its national security strategy as a tool for preventing the formation or continued existence of states where international terrorists can organize and operate. The more partisan of those observers further claim that candidate George W. Bush was wrong to criticize nation building during the 2000 presidential campaign and that the Clinton administration's much-maligned efforts in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo are vindicated as a result. Such claims, however, are simplistic and amount to little more than an attempt to dress up nation building in the realist attire of national self-interest.

Is Nation Building the Best Defense?

Shortly after September 11, the Washington, D.C.-based Fund for Peace held a four-day conference to discuss African perspectives on military intervention. Urging greater U.S. assistance and more American involvement in African affairs, one participant pointedly asked:

Whoever thought Afghanistan could be a place where terrorism could be bred and organized to attack the United States? [It] was the most useless, disorganized place.... The state had collapsed. A group of people organized themselves and pretended to be a government. Someone with a lot of money came in and became an important person. What is going to stop terrorists from organizing in Africa? When African nations are working to restore order, democracy, and stability, [U.S. involvement] is in American as well as African interests.

Although the conference participants were not unanimous in all their opinions, most maintained that "U.S. interests would be well served by a peaceful and prosperous African continent," and they further argued that the "United States should...[therefore] make certain that Africa receives its fair share of UN resources for prevention, peacekeeping, and nation building."

This view represents what can be called the "Nation Building Is the Best Defense" school of thought, and it has become very popular lately. The European Union's external affairs commissioner, Chris Patten, says that the "events of September 11 brought home to us that the existence of failed states"—like the one the Taliban took over in Afghanistan—is "something which contributes to both regional and global instability; that is a problem to which we must devote more time, more political energy, and more money." Similarly, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer says: "Investments in peace are now more essential than ever in light of the threat from a murderous international terrorist network. That has to mean greater commitment to...the construction of civil societies."

In the United States, many former Clinton administration officials have been voicing similar recommendations. Former state department lawyer Paul Williams claims that not only must Washington "be ready with a strategy for Afghan nation building" but that it "cannot prevent the...spawning of new terrorist networks unless it works to build a more stable post-terrorist environment in...the region from the Black Sea to Western China." Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, both former Clinton national security council officials, go even further. They claim that the "post-Cold War era abruptly ended the morning of September 11" and now "we must intensify our efforts to resolve conflicts around the world, and especially in the Middle East....We must also intensify support for democracy and promote economic development—especially in areas like Central Asia, the Arab world, and northern Africa."

Derek Chollet, a former aide to U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, agrees. He says
that “nation building” should be “a legitimate and fundamental part of U.S. foreign and military policy.” He warns that “if the United States doesn’t put serious resources behind such efforts now, then it’s only planting the seeds for future crises.”

Recommended perhaps the most expansive nation-building agenda, however, is UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. He says that September 11 should make everyone realize that when governments like the Taliban are allowed to “violate the rights of their individual citizens, they become a menace not only to their own people, but also to their neighbors, and indeed the world.” Thus, enforcing rights across borders should supersede traditional notions of sovereignty and national interest from now on. “This will require us to look beyond the framework of states,” he says, and “focus, as never before, on improving the conditions of the individual men and women who give the state or nation its richness and character.”

Time for a Reality Check

Are any of those proposals a realistic way to combat terrorism? Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization, which was responsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States, reportedly has operations in 68 countries, from the Philippines and Indonesia to Egypt and Algeria. How many of those countries should be targeted for nation building? And al-Qaeda isn’t the only terrorist organization out there. According to the State Department’s latest Patterns of Global Terrorism, there are 42 other significant terrorist organizations operating in dozens of countries around the globe. Complicating matters still further—at least under Annan’s sprawling definition of potential terrorist threats—are an estimated 106 countries with oppressive or semioppressive governments. That means as many as 3.6 billion people, or 59 percent of the world’s population, should logically become the subjects of foreign nation-building efforts. Such numbers raise obvious practical questions.

Furthermore, the idea that “Nation Building Is the Best Defense” rests on several debatable assumptions—such as that poverty and ignorance are the root causes of terrorism and that undertaking multiple nation-building missions will significantly reduce the potential for terrorist acts.

It also draws on false analogies with the past. Several observers, for example, assume that Europe’s Marshall Plan experience can be readily exported to an assortment of countries and that, with enough money, experienced bureaucrats, and military firepower, retrograde states anywhere can be turned into open, self-sustaining, peaceful democracies, as Germany and Japan were after World War II.

As worrisome, the ideological underpinnings of the idea that “Nation Building Is the Best Defense” echo one of the standard justifications of the welfare state in our domestic setting: namely, we are wise to support big government and generous entitlement programs to prevent the formation of social pathologies that could cause the rest of us physical harm. Some advocates of nation building have made that ideological link explicit. Author David Callahan, for example, says:

Domestically, Americans are all too familiar with the consequences of allowing certain places to sink into despair and squalor. Most Americans have no regular contact with inner cities, and... the ghettos are largely isolated from the mainstream of U.S. life. But still, their cost to the public at large is enormous. ...While most of the violence of inner-city residents is targeted at one another, some of it is perpetrated against citizens in the wider society. Global ghettos like Burundi and Kurdistan have similar effects.... The violence within them regularly overflows in the form of terrorism or drug and arms exports.

In other words, nation building, like the welfare state, is good for us. Self-interest and the interest of broadening the government’s dominion are no longer incompatible.
Do Poverty and Ignorance Cause Terrorism?

Hardly a day goes by without a politician or expert proposing more foreign aid or support for education as a cure for terrorism. “The dragon’s teeth are planted in the fertile soil of . . . poverty and deprivation,” British prime minister Tony Blair tells us, so foreign assistance efforts must be ramped up around the world because that will reduce the terrorist threat. Jessica Stern, a Harvard University lecturer on terrorism, proclaims, “We have a stake in the welfare of other peoples and need to devote a much higher priority to health, education, and economic development, or new Osamas will continue to arise.” Her clear implication: if these issues are adequately addressed, the terrorist threat will be reduced or eliminated.

That line of reasoning, however, makes several false assumptions about the root causes of terrorism. For starters, no evidence links poverty and ignorance to the present terrorist challenge faced by the United States. Bin Laden is a multimillionaire, and the hijackers who flew fully fueled jetliners into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 were highly educated and well off. Bin Laden, moreover, has never claimed that he acts on behalf of the poor and the illiterate, or that his goal is to redress the disparities between rich and poor countries. His goal is to eliminate opposition and gain power.

The “root causes” explanation is flawed for another reason: Poverty can exist without terrorism, as it did during the Great Depression and does today in most of sub-Saharan Africa. And terrorism can thrive without poverty. In fact, left-wing terrorists, such as the German Baader-Meinhoff gang and the Italian Red Brigade, during the 1970s and 1980s were overwhelmingly middle class, and 15 of the 19 September 11 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, an exceptionally rich country. If the view that poverty and ignorance cause terrorism were correct, then Saudis would be some of the most peaceful people on earth. Instead, Saudi Arabia is a top breeding ground for terrorists. In fact, a recent survey of educated Saudis between the ages of 25 and 41 found that 95 percent of them “had sympathy for the cause of . . . Osama bin Laden.”

Moreover, if there were any truth to the idea that poverty and ignorance are the root causes of terrorism, one would also expect terrorism to rise in countries during periods of economic hardship and fall during boom times. “In fact, the opposite tends to hold,” says Alan Krueger, professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton University. The academic evidence on terrorists “suggests that the common stereotype that they come from the ranks of the most uneducated and economically deprived is a myth.” Indeed, consider the research of United Nations relief worker Nasra Hassan. From 1996 to 1999 she interviewed nearly 250 people involved in terrorist attacks, including failed bombers, families of deceased bombers, and trainers. Her conclusion, as reported by Krueger: “None of them were uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed.”

Professor Ariel Merari, director of the Political Violence Research Center at Tel Aviv University, agrees. “All information that I have also indicates that there is no connection between socioeconomic indicators and involvement in militant/terrorist activity in general and in suicide attacks in particular, at least as much as the Palestinian case is concerned.”

Similarly, Egyptian social scientist Saad Eddin Ibrahim has found that followers of militant Islam in his country tend not to be children of poverty and ignorance. After interviewing several of them serving time in Egyptian prisons, he discovered that the typical member is “young (early twenties), of rural or small-town background, from the middle or lower-middle class, with high achievement and motivation, upwardly mobile, with science or engineering education, and from a normally cohesive family.” In short, Ibrahim found that these individuals were “significantly above average in their generation” and otherwise “ideal or model young Egyptians.”

In a subsequent study, he found that 21 of 34 members of the militant At-Takfir w’al-Hijra group in Egypt had fathers who were not
impoverished; they were midlevel bureaucrats. More recently, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service noted that the leadership of another militant Egyptian group, Al-Jihad, "is largely university educated with middle-class backgrounds."  

What is more, the average illiteracy rate of men in the seven countries the U.S. Department of State considers sponsors of terrorism—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria—is 17 percent, about the same as the worldwide rate. What is more, Ireland and Spain, which have struggled with terrorism for decades, are neither poor nor neglectful of education.  

In addition to being flawed, the idea that poverty and ignorance are the root causes of terrorism is inconsistently applied. No one making the case for more foreign economic or educational aid, for example, has suggested that the Oklahoma City bombing carried out by Timothy McVeigh and his collaborators had its “root causes” in poverty or a lack of basic education, or that such terrorism would have been prevented by spending more on entitlement programs and schools.  

The “root causes” approach also wrongly assumes that the United States and its allies are in a position to alleviate poverty and ignorance around the globe. The source of poverty and ignorance in much of the world tends to lie in the unwillingness of many states—especially in the Muslim world—to make themselves competitive in the global economy. Poor countries, in other words, have adopted poor policies. The key to becoming rich does not lie in another splurge of foreign aid. It lies in poor countries adopting policies that reduce trade barriers, respect the rule of law and private property, curb inflation, cut wasteful spending and corruption, and limit meddling in domestic markets. Western governments can augment those reforms by opening their own markets to Third World exports. Right now, the United States imposes its highest trade barriers on the exports that are most important to poor countries, such as sugar, footwear, clothing, and textiles. Washington could deliver far more immediate and long-lasting “aid” to poor farmers and workers around the world by allowing them to sell what they produce duty-free in the U.S. market. But the bulk of the necessary reforms must be made by the countries themselves.  

**Money and Terrorism**  
Contrary to the claim that poverty and ignorance are the root causes of terrorism, recent research suggests that easy access to cash is a better predictor of political violence.  
Looking at civil conflicts between 1965 and 1999, World Bank economist Paul Collier has found that rebellion and civil war largely occur in countries with lootable sources of cash, such as diamonds in Angola, cocaine in Colombia, and timber in Cambodia. The existence of a large diaspora that funnels money to rebel or terrorist groups is another powerful predictor of civil violence. (For example, Irish Americans have funded the Irish Republican Army for years, and ethnic Albanians living in Switzerland and Germany set up the Homeland Calling Fund to bankroll the Kosovo Liberation Army.) “The economic theory of conflict,” explains Collier, “argues that the motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially... It can only fight if it is financially viable during the conflict.”

“Equally striking,” continues Collier, “is what does not appear to affect conflict risk. Inequality, whether of income or assets, has no discernible effect. Unequal societies are not more prone to conflict.” If poor or unequal societies are at risk, it is because their governments’ internal opponents have access to money. “Indeed,” says Collier, “if anything, rebellion seems to be the rage of the rich.”

According to that view of conflict, generous foreign aid and nation building could create tempting new targets for looting that could feed the cycle of violence. That is precisely what happened in Somalia in 1992-93. Somalia’s warlords attempted to exact as much political advantage for themselves as possible from the well-meaning intervention. They also siphoned off large amounts of cash from the multitude of nation builders who...
descended on Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital. Relief workers, reconstruction experts, and UN personnel were all charged exorbitant rent to live and work in properties that, in one way or another, were controlled by the principal warlords. The local drivers, translators, and office personnel who were hired were also almost always affiliated with the area clan and paid part of their earnings to the local warlord. On many occasions, factional skirmishes occurred over the spoils of nation building, not clan politics. Somalia’s warlords would then turn around and use their newfound cash to buy more guns and ammunition.

A New Marshall Plan?

If poverty and ignorance are not really the root causes of terrorism, then foreign aid cannot be seriously considered the cure. Still, several politicians, nongovernmental organizations, and policy experts have called for a new Marshall Plan for Central Asia and, in some cases, the entire Third World. The idea would be modeled on Secretary of State George C. Marshall’s economic plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. In an address at Harvard University in 1947, Marshall proclaimed that the “desperation of the people” ravaged by years of war needed to be considered and that U.S. policy was directed not against the Soviet Union or communism specifically, “but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.”

Following those words, the U.S. government proceeded to pump billions of dollars into Europe.

Today, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden (D-Del.), says that an American-led nation-building effort in Central Asia is the long-term solution to the terrorism problem and that this effort should focus on changing the economic and social climate of Afghanistan and its neighbors with something akin to the Marshall Plan’s reconstruction of Europe.

Going even further, British finance minister Gordon Brown has called on the industrialized world to draw up a 50-year, $2.5-trillion Marshall Plan for the developing world. “After World War II,” he says, American visionaries seized a powerful and unprecedented moment of opportunity. They created not only a new military and political settlement but a new economic and social order. ... And their plan, the Marshall Plan, transferred one percent of national income every year, for four years, from America to poverty-stricken countries—not as an act of charity but in recognition that, like peace, prosperity was indivisible and to be sustained it had to be shared. America’s postwar achievement should be our inspiration today for both rebuilding Afghanistan and for a new global alliance for prosperity between developed and developing worlds.

In a similar vein, the Washington, D.C.-based Worldwatch Institute is proposing a new global Marshall Plan to provide everyone on earth with a basic standard of living. The directors of the international anti-poverty group RESULTS, say:

In thinking of future global security, we would advise U.S. President George W. Bush to consult a presidential advisor from the past, former U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall, the architect of the European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan. We have seen the precedent for this. After World War II, an unprecedented amount of foreign aid was poured into Western Europe in order to reconstruct national economies and people’s lives that had been decimated by the ravages of war. The result of that aid created some of the world’s most developed countries within two decades. Surely the ravages of global poverty deserve a global response of equal magnitude.
Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs says that, by devoting just a few tenths of a percent more of our gross domestic product to foreign aid, the U.S. government could save millions of lives in poor countries and “ensure that the basic needs of health and education are met for all impoverished children in this world.”

Jim Redden, policy director for the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, advocates not only an increase in foreign aid but also “highly desirable . . . concepts of global taxation aimed at redistributing from the rich to the poor.”

That tax idea has been taken up elsewhere. Prime Minister Gerhard Schroder of Germany and his French counterpart Lionel Jospin recently set up a high-level commission to study the feasibility of the so-called Tobin Tax on international financial transactions. The idea of imposing a tax of from 0.1 to 1 percent on currency conversions was originally floated by economist James Tobin 30 years ago as a way to dampen currency speculation, which hit developing countries especially hard. Today, it is being discussed as a way to finance a massive new program of foreign aid. In related moves, French finance minister Laurent Fabius has ordered a study of an arms tax on weapons manufacturers to raise more money for foreign aid spending, and a European Commission team is looking into a carbon tax, which would be levied on businesses according to their consumption of fossil fuels.

The idea of a new Marshall Plan must be approached critically. It is telling that one has to go back more than 50 years to find an example of such an aid plan that worked. Similar plans have routinely failed since then. Indeed, since World War II the United States alone has provided $1 trillion in foreign aid to various countries. The result? According to the United Nations, 70 of the countries that received aid were poorer in 1997 than they were in 1980, and an incredible 43 were worse off than in 1970.

A Critical Appraisal

The failures are not so surprising if one studies the actual Marshall Plan experience more carefully. If massive government spending could work anywhere, it was in Europe in 1948: Skilled labor was largely available, the rule of law and property rights had a long history, and the customs of a commercial society were readily recoverable. The only thing lacking was physical capital, since so much of it had been destroyed during the war. But even given those favorable circumstances, there is no conclusive evidence that the Marshall Plan alone was responsible for Europe’s regrowth. Indeed, U.S. assistance never exceeded 5 percent of the GDP of any recipient nation, an assistance total that was minuscule compared with the growth that occurred in the 1950s, according to economist Tyler Cowen. Moreover, there seemed to be an inverse relationship between economic aid and economic recovery. In fact, France, Germany, and Italy all began to grow before the onset of the Marshall Plan, and Great Britain, the recipient of the most aid, performed the most poorly. The real lesson of the Marshall Plan is that the rule of law, property rights, free markets, and an entrepreneurial culture are what are necessary for economic success.

That brings any analysis of the Marshall Plan back to a central point: The rest of the world is not like Germany or Japan. Both countries had homogeneous populations that had not been divided by years of bloody interethnic conflict. Moreover, high levels of education and industrial know-how helped launch in both countries an economic recovery that is inconceivable almost anywhere else in the world. Germany had a strong tradition of the rule of law, property rights, and free trade before the Nazi era. And Japan’s elite embraced an honorific culture that respected and obeyed the wishes of the victor in battle. In contrast, Afghanistan, its neighbors, and most of the Muslim world have little in the way of either liberal traditions or cultural attitudes that might make a foreign economic reconstruction effort as successful.

What’s more, in contrast to Afghanistan’s ascendant warlords, the leaders of Germany
Withholding foreign aid from oppressive, nationalistic, or undemocratic countries and territories would mean withholding it from the very places nation builders claim pose the greatest danger of producing terrorism.

Historians and social scientists have also documented how the Germans and Japanese had become receptive to profound political change even before the war was over. Those factors made both countries prime candidates for nation building.

The belief that the same pattern holds for other countries that are poor and ravaged by war is simply not supported by recent history; the West has spent nearly seven years and $20 billion nation building in Bosnia, but the extremist parties and politicians have remained popular, if not highly electable, since the war ended. Ironically, withholding foreign aid from oppressive, nationalistic, or undemocratic countries and territories would mean withholding it from the very places nation builders claim pose the greatest danger of producing terrorism, which is their rationale for more foreign aid spending in the first place. Granting aid does not necessarily “uncause” terrorism: the United States was by far the largest donor of food and other aid to Afghanistan before September 11, but still, New York and Washington were the targets of terrorism.

False Pragmatism

According to Prime Minister Tony Blair, “In the war against terrorism, the moralists and the realists are partners, not antagonists.” Washington Post columnist E. J. Dionne Jr. agrees: Afghanistan’s failure and the rise of the Taliban demonstrate that “there is a practical side to humanitarianism and even nation building.”

A variant of that idea has taken root in the defense and counterterrorism communities, where it is sometimes argued that molding the political landscape of other countries is now a precondition of U.S. security. In the case of Afghanistan, for instance, a senior defense analyst at DFI Government Practices, a consulting group for the Pentagon, says the “international community” must not only eliminate the Taliban but also “disarm, dis-suade, and if necessary defeat local factions determined to play a ‘spoiler’ role.” More broadly, RAND Corporation counterterrorism expert Ian Lesser recommends that the United States do more “environment shaping” all around the world to reduce the terrorist threat. But that is just a euphemism for more interventionism and nation building. Consider Lesser’s argument in more detail:

The failure of regimes to provide for peaceful political change and the phenomenon of economies unable to keep pace with population growth and demands for more evenly distributed benefits can provide fertile ground for extremism and political violence affecting U.S. interests. For this reason, the United States has a stake in promoting political and economic reform as a means of reducing the potential for terrorism. Similarly, unresolved ethnic and nationalist conflicts have traditionally been a leading source of terrorism. Diplomacy and the use of force can contribute both to the containment and the eventual resolutions of such conflicts, whether in the context of the Palestinian issue, nationalist confrontations in the Balkans or the Caucasus, or ethnic frictions in Africa.

The idea of “shaping the international environment” is not new; it was a catchall phrase developed by the Clinton administration in the mid-1990s to shoehorn international social work and nation building into its national security strategy. It became the centerpiece of the White House’s 1997 National Security Strategy for a New Century and the Pentagon’s 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The idea, explained former secretary of defense William Cohen, would be “to shape people’s opinions about us in ways that are favorable to us. To shape events that will affect our livelihood and our security.” And we can do that, he said, because “when
people see us, they see our power, they see our professionalism, they see our patriotism, and they say, that's a country that we want to be with. In addition to military intervention, advocates of that approach want U.S. military commanders to attempt to shape the international environment through such tactics as military-to-military contacts, ship visits, equipment transfers, training missions, and exercises that are supposed to win friends and influence for the United States. Diplomats, meanwhile, should try to shape the international environment through international assistance activities, democracy promotion programs, and economic sanctions.

Such thinking is only a step away from claiming that “empire” is America’s best defense, a view being promoted by journalists such as Max Boot, Sebastian Mallaby, and William Kristol. The fact remains, however, that “shaping” will not necessarily stem the tide of terrorism: It can actually provoke it and export fresh targets right to the terrorist at no appreciable gain to the United States. Witness the ill-fated visit of the USS Cole to the port of Aden in Yemen in October 2000. The decision to send a U.S. warship to such a snake pit of Islamic militancy came, not as the result of some bureaucratic error, but on the orders of Gen. Anthony Zinni, then serving as the U.S. Central Command’s commander in chief responsible for the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Zinni dispatched the Cole to Aden, not because it was the only port in the area that had fuel available, but because he had decided that “we needed to do more engagement” in Yemen in support of the Clinton administration’s larger effort to “shape” the region through military contacts. Seventeen Americans paid with their lives, and the terrorist organization that carried out the attack, al-Qaeda, continued to operate in Yemen afterwards.

The Cole incident, however, is not the only example that should raise doubts about the formulation that more nation building, or “shaping,” or whatever one wants to call it, leads to less terrorism. America’s experiences in Lebanon, Somalia, and the Balkans suggest the opposite. Nation building creates incentives and targets for terrorism, especially when U.S. forces are drawn too deeply into internal power struggles.

**Lebanon**

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli Defense Force launched attacks into southern Lebanon as part of Operation Peace for Galilee. What the IDF initially said would be a limited offensive against Palestinian Liberation Organization forces to clear a buffer zone of safety for Jewish settlements in northern Israel ended up producing major battles with Syrian forces from the north. The IDF’s cross-border pursuit of the PLO soon turned into a full-scale siege of Beirut, a city on Lebanon’s coast and home to more then half a million people. The United States decided to intervene to provide a buffer between the IDF, the PLO, and Syrian forces so that the PLO could be evacuated. That was supposed to end the stalemate, save face for the PLO, and allow Israel to achieve its security objective for its northern settlements.

The intervention was based on the premise that a neutral third party can intervene between hostile parties and act as a deterrent because none of the hostile parties would want to shoot at the neutral party and be seen as an aggressor. But Lebanon’s unfortunate and distinguishing characteristic was that it was the home of a violent, multidimensional religious rivalry involving some 16 sects. Militias abounded throughout the country, and each faction attempted to use the intervention of Israel, Syria, and the United States to its own advantage.

A major goal of U.S. policy became the establishment in Lebanon of a strong central government capable of extending its authority beyond Beirut to both Christian and Muslim areas; that is, nation building. But the political facts on the ground made any attempt on the part of an outsider to appear nonpartisan virtually impossible. The United States soon found itself sucked into Lebanon’s internal politics on the side of one faction: the Maronite Catholics allied with Israel. It was precisely the strengthening of...
that one side's control that undermined the security of the other sides.

Having lost their neutrality, U.S. Marines increasingly became targets of violence. By October 22, 1983, Marine casualties totaled 7 killed and 64 wounded as a result of direct and indirect weapons fire. The following day, 241 were killed when a terrorist truck bomb was driven into their barracks at the Beirut airport. The U.S. mission to nation build in Lebanon quickly collapsed.

The chronology was clear: outside intervention disrupted the internal political setting in Lebanon, triggering a backlash that led to the embarrassing withdrawal of American troops. And therein lies the lesson: it is impossible for an intervening party, acting alone or in concert with others, to keep its nation-building activities from altering the power calculations of rival factions that are still maneuvering to dominate or outlast each other, as they were in Lebanon. In many cases the aggrieved factions will respond with violence. Ten years later, the consequences of that problem were again made painfully evident in Somalia.

Somalia

For much of 1992 Somalia was in a state of anarchy. The two rebel movements that had successfully ousted the government of Gen. Mohammed Siad Barre had become engulfed in internal clan rivalries. In all, more than a dozen factions began fighting and maneuvering for control in Somalia. Clan elders tried in vain to negotiate a cease-fire, and the fighting continued for months as the quantity of guns and ammunition quickly surpassed that of food and medicine. Relief organizations soon began to see their supplies plundered by Somalia’s warlords, each of whom was committed to keeping his own militia well fed.

Under increasing pressure from the media and some members of Congress to do something about the situation, the outgoing Bush administration sent 21,000 U.S. troops to reopen supply routes and to get the food moving again. On March 26, 1993, roughly nine weeks after taking office, President Bill Clinton had his newly appointed ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, cast Washington’s vote in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 814, a six-page document that formally commenced America’s attempt at nation building in Somalia.

At first, the commander most responsible for ousting the Barre government, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, welcomed the outside intervention. He felt it was only natural that he would become Somalia’s new leader. His view was reinforced when the Americans, and later the United Nations, established their headquarters in his sector of Mogadishu. To his dismay, however, their presence meant that foreign peacekeepers were more likely to be disarming his militia, which advantaged his chief rival, Ali Mahdi. Meanwhile, Ali Mahdi understood that he was weaker than Aidid militarily, so he maneuvered to use the United States and the United Nations to his political advantage. He soon began forging numerous links with influential American and UN personnel and played along with their nation-building plans. Consequently, tension grew even more between Aidid and the U.S. and UN forces, which he came increasingly to see as an emerging ally of Ali Mahdi.

With the Clinton administration’s fateful decision to launch a manhunt for Aidid, Washington unintentionally fed into Somalia’s cycle of violence. “Unfortunately, we’ve allowed ourselves to be sucked into choosing sides and picking good guys and bad guys,” warned T. Frank Crigler, a former U.S. ambassador to Somalia. Depending on their clan allegiance, many Somalis came to view U.S. and UN forces as the newest parties in their war, and that view only helped fuel the conflict between the different Somali factions. In fact, dozens of factional chiefs and subchiefs immediately began jockeying for power and Western largesse after the U.S.-led military campaign commenced against Aidid. Meanwhile, Aaid portrayed himself as the aggrieved party, and his stature as a folk
hero was raised. He then launched a low-intensity guerrilla war against the multinational presence in Somalia.

The turning point in Washington’s nation-building operation in Somalia came on October 3, 1993, when a major U.S. assault on Aidid’s positions in Mogadishu resulted in the shooting down of two U.S. Black Hawk combat helicopters. Eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed and 76 were wounded in the firefight that ensued. More than 1,000 Somalis, including women and children, were killed during the fighting. President Clinton’s initial response was to justify the soldiers’ deaths by claiming that they “lost their lives in a very successful mission against brutality and anarchy.” Days later, he announced that U.S. troops would be withdrawn within six months. The folly of Beirut had been repeated.

The Balkans

The Bosnian government has long been criticized for providing an easy backdoor route to Europe for Islamic terrorists posing as asylum seekers. Muslims from anywhere in the world do not need visas to enter Bosnia, and only cursory checks are made on the identities of incoming travelers. Moreover, UN investigators say that fewer than one-tenth of “vacationers” from the Middle East and Central Asia ever return home from Bosnia. Western immigration and intelligence officials are especially concerned about people who fly to Bosnia and then move across its porous borders into Western Europe with official Bosnian documentation.

The Bosnian Muslim weekly Dani has reported that bin Laden himself was issued a Bosnian passport in Vienna in 1993. The newspaper also revealed that the Bosnian Foreign Ministry was “seized by panic” when a Bosnian passport surfaced in the hands of Mehrez Aodouni, an Arab terrorist arrested in Istanbul, Turkey. Aodouni had obtained Bosnian citizenship and a passport “because he was a member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army.”

Thousands of Mujahideen fighters from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere were smuggled into Bosnia to help fight the Serbs and Croats during the country’s 1992-95 civil war. Many remain in Bosnia today and are considered an ongoing threat to Western forces there despite NATO’s intervention on the Muslim side and billions of dollars spent on nation building.

In October 2001 NATO narrowly foiled a terrorist attack on American military installations by Islamic militants living in Bosnia. According to Western news reports, the terrorists, five of whom were naturalized Bosnian citizens, had intended to fly small planes and helicopters from Visoko airfield, a grass strip northwest of Sarajevo, and strike two U.S. bases, including Eagle Base in Tuzla where thousands of U.S. soldiers are stationed.

Earlier that month British and American troops arrested Bensayah Belkacem, who was conspiring with the al-Qaeda terror network’s senior command to obtain Bosnian passports. U.S. intelligence believed the urgent demand for passports suggested that al-Qaeda was actively plotting new suicide missions in Western Europe or the United States. Belkacem was a naturalized Bosnian citizen from Algeria. When he arrived in Bosnia in 1995, he went to Zenica, a stronghold for militant Muslims 25 miles northwest of Sarajevo. The eventual decision by Bosnia’s fragile coalition government to allow the extradition of Belkacem and other terrorist suspects to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, angered many Bosnian Muslims. The backlash could help propel the Party of Democratic Action, Bosnia’s main nationalist Muslim party, back into the national driver’s seat in elections later this year.

In Kosovo U.S. peacekeepers have been nation building since June 1999, but in December 2001 they raided the offices of a Muslim charity as part of an ongoing investigation of funding for bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terror network. A NATO statement said that the raids were on two offices of the Global Relief Foundation, which each year raises and distributes millions of dollars to Muslim nations and territories around the world. “After receiving credible intelligence informa-
tion that individuals working for this organization may have been directly involved in supporting worldwide international terrorist activities," the statement explained, NATO was forced to take action.67

Just as worrisome, former Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas—whose goals the United States helped to champion—have fought alongside al-Qaeda units in Afghanistan. At an abandoned al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, U.S. forces found recruitment applications written by prospective al-Qaeda terrorists. Damir Bajrami, a 24-year-old ethnic Albanian from Kosovo, wrote: "I am interested in suicide operations.... I have Kosovo Liberation Army combat experience against Serb and American forces. I need no further training. I recommend [suicide] operations against [amusement] parks like Disney."68 It seems that even places the United States apparently "saves," such as Kosovo, can produce viciously anti-American terrorists.

The problem of failed states is not usually one of too little outside involvement or not enough foreign aid. It is a problem of fake countries and flawed borders.

**Deter Them If You Can, Kill Them If You Must**

A policy of credible deterrence—in conjunction with improving the traditional counterterrorist instruments of diplomacy, intelligence, and law enforcement—would be a far more effective way to combat terrorism than are unpromising and open-ended nation-building efforts. The groundwork for that policy is already being laid by the Bush administration’s handling of Afghanistan, which is setting an unambiguous precedent in the pursuit of American national security: if you harbor terrorists that target America, you will forfeit your control over the levers of power. That message already appears to be getting across to other countries.

On December 18, 2001, soldiers and police in Yemen raided a village in the east of the country where they believed members of al-Qaeda were hiding. At least 12 people were reported killed during the operation. While the number of government forces involved in the action was small, it was nonetheless highly significant that a Muslim country launched a paramilitary strike against the al-Qaeda network operating within its own borders.69

In Sudan the government has been trying to clean up its act. It has expelled roughly 3,000 al-Qaeda supporters from the country and put under house arrest Hassan Turabi, an influential Islamic cleric and militant leader who gave bin Laden sanctuary in Sudan during the 1990s.70 There are also some indications that the Sudanese government is willing to cooperate with the United States on a more covert level, too. On September 13, a cargo jet that bin Laden had left at the Khartoum airport for five years suddenly burst into flames.71 The Sudanese government officially says that a brushfire was responsible. "The only problem with that [explanation]," says a U.S. official, "is that the aircraft was parked on tarmac."72

**Are Failed States Really a Threat?**

When it comes to combating terrorism in lands where there is no government to deter—that is, in failed states—recommended nation-building solution misconstrues the political problem. The problem of failed states is not usually one of too little outside involvement or not enough foreign aid. It is a problem of fake countries and flawed borders, which are usually the remnant of colonialism or the practical consequence of intercommunal warfare, or both. Redrawing new boundaries has been anathema to policymakers, but it is the adherence to unrealistic old borders that creates failed states and their deadly byproducts.73

Combating terrorism in failed states by nation building also misconstrues the military problem. Take Somalia, where U.S. forces were involved in nation building a decade ago. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz correctly notes that Somalia is a "special case because it really isn’t a governed country at all. It also means there’s not much to protect the terrorists when they get there."74 Jonathan Stevenson, a research fel-
low at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, agrees: “Keeping al-Qaeda out of Somalia—not pacifying the country—is the prime objective. This... will not require a commitment of the 25,000 ground troops deployed in 1992–93, and will not raise comparable force-protection concerns.” In other words, if the goal is to combat terrorism, then nation building in failed states is unwarranted. Failed states are where the terrorists are most vulnerable to covert action, commando raids, surprise attacks, and local informants willing to work for a few dollars. Failed states are not “safe havens”; they are defenseless positions.

Appealing to the “Nation Building Is the Best Defense” lobby, however, three Somali warlords are calling for a new international military and political intervention in Somalia to rout out terrorism. But diplomats warn that the three warlords—including the one whose militia was responsible for the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers in 1993—have seized on the U.S. anti-terror campaign as their own route back to power. They apparently hope that accusing Somalia’s shaky transitional national government of doing too little to combat terrorism will convince Washington to intervene and destroy the transitional government on their behalf. According to one official familiar with Somalia, “The new game in town is to call your enemy a terrorist and hope that America will destroy him for you.”

There are already signs that this phenomenon is occurring in Afghanistan. In December 2001 U.S. air strikes destroyed a convoy on a road in Paktia province. The Pentagon said the attack was a legitimate and deliberate strike on fleeing Taliban officials, but Afghan leaders protested that it was a mistake, that the convoy was made up of local leaders on their way to Kabul for the inauguration of Afghanistan’s new leader, Hamid Karzai. Both sides were partially correct. The convoy was made up of tribal elders heading to Kabul, and they were Taliban who had just switched sides when it became clear to them that the United States was going to win the war. An informant, who did not like someone in the convoy, told U.S. military operatives the convoy was Taliban, so U.S. warplanes destroyed the convoy, killing more than 50 people.

According to an Afghan intelligence officer, feuding Afghan clans have also been using the hunt for bin Laden and Taliban chief Mullah Mohammad Omar to mislead U.S. forces and drag them into Afghanistan’s age-old tribal disputes. In January 2002 American special forces raided Hazar Qadam, 60 miles north of Kandahar. Local villagers claimed that U.S. troops were badly misled about the operation, which they say killed 15 anti-Taliban fighters headed by Haji Sana Gul, a local ethnic leader who had just disarmed a number of Taliban soldiers still holding out in the area. A U.S. Army spokesman said that suggestions that anti-Taliban forces had been wrongly attacked “are not consistent with our intelligence.” But American officials have since acknowledged that they made a mistake and admitted they rely on information from members of rival ethnic groups whose loyalties are frequently shifting.

Meanwhile, the problems of creating a multiethnic state have been underlined by skirmishes in the north between rival commanders linked to the interim government’s two top defense chiefs, fighting in the east between two warlords battling for local dominance, and a tense standoff between two other warlords in the southwest. The skirmishes in the north have been between one commander loyal to Afghanistan’s interim defense minister Mohammad Fahim, an ethnic Tajik, and another loyal to interim deputy defense minister Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek. In the east, heavy fighting broke out in late January 2002 between rival Pashtun warlords Padsha Khan and Saif Ullah. And in the southwest another conflict looms as a commander in Kandahar province says 20,000 tribal fighters are ready to attack western Herat province because the Herat warlord, Ismail Khan, has been allowing in Iranian fighters and preying on trade convoys.

Still, many observers insist that nation building must be the right answer in Afghanistan if the goal is to combat terrorism, then nation building in failed states is unwarranted. Failed states are where the terrorists are most vulnerable to covert action, commando raids, surprise attacks, and local informants willing to work for a few dollars.
because “it was our failure to stay engaged in the region after the Cold War that permitted the rise of the Taliban and turned Afghanistan into a safe harbor for terrorists.” But why should outside “engagement” have been the default U.S. position after Washington helped Afghanistan to liberate itself? That France did not stick around to nation build in the United States after it helped the American colonists throw off the British crown was a good thing. What’s more, Afghanistan had been relatively stable from 1930 through 1978. The reality is that it was external meddling—not the lack of it—that disrupted internal Afghan politics and led to the emergence of the Taliban. First, the Soviet-backed Afghan communists sought to impose their authoritarian rule on a fiercely independent and traditional society. That led to civil war. Then the United States further unbalanced Afghanistan’s internal politics by supporting its most extreme anti-Soviet and anti-modern elements. Finally, Pakistan’s internal security services, or ISI, supported the Taliban faction, because it was best positioned to secure Islamabad’s strategic interests in the region. The lesson of Afghanistan is not that there hasn’t been enough outside meddling but that there has been too much.

**Some of These Things Are Not Like the Others**

In 1860 the Italian nationalist writer Massimo Taparelli d’Azeglio wrote “We have created Italy. Now all we need is to create Italians.” They were able to do so because they had a shared language, a common religion, growing economic prosperity, and were surrounded by water or high mountains on all sides.

The thinking today is that, with enough money, bureaucratic administrators, and military force of arms, outsiders can impose modern economic and democratic state structures on any country in the world. And if a country is composed of antagonistic groups, then it is the duty of the West to ensure that they live together until they like it.

Afghanistan is ethnically, tribally, and religiously segmented. Its borders separate some members of ethnic groups from other members who are the majority in neighboring states. “Even today, many—perhaps most—Afghans give their primary allegiance to local leaders, ethnic groups, and tribes,” explain Carnegie Endowment scholars Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven. “Afghanistan was only created at the end of the nineteenth century. All of its borders were in effect determined by the British Empire, and reflected not an internal historical or ethnic logic, but an imperial one.”

Proponents of nation building behave as if none of that matters in the long run. What is important is that “the international community pursues an aggressive strategy for regional development; [or] new bin Ladens will emerge to take his place and Afghanistan-like states will proliferate.” But what does that mean in practice? Is the international community prepared to send peacekeeping forces to countries like Afghanistan proportional to what it has to, say, Kosovo? Even with 40,000 NATO troops, the problems in transforming that tiny corner of Europe have been immense. Indeed, NATO’s military occupation, which began in June 1999, did not prevent the intimidation and expulsion of 250,000 non-Albanians, the massive spread of organized crime, or the initiation of a cross-border insurgency into neighboring Macedonia by the Kosovo Liberation Army. Afghanistan is 59 times the size of Kosovo and has a population 13 times larger. It also has extremely difficult terrain and an array of battle-hardened warlords with their own personal fiefdoms to protect.

Many advocates of nation building claim that the “right response to this danger is to provide the central government [in Afghanistan] with the military muscle to enforce its writ in the country”; that is, send in a massive U.S.-led peacekeeping force. As is so often the case with nation builders, they presume that nation building will work and that failure simply means that insufficient force of arms, political energy, or economic aid was applied. Thus, nation builders always have the same unfalsifiable excuse when nation building comes up short: it’s not because there are practical limits
to what government, including the U.S. government, can do but because the effort was not pursued vigorously enough.

Putting aside the obvious self-reinforcing circularity of that reasoning, deploying a huge number of American troops in Afghanistan is unnecessary and unwise. It is unnecessary because the security of the United States does not require a multiethnic, liberal democracy in Afghanistan. In requires only that the government or governments there be deterred from harboring terrorists as the Taliban once did.

It is unwise because making Americans peacekeepers risks needless U.S. casualties, kidnappings, and other distractions that can erode morale and public support for the war against terrorism. As columnist Charles Krauthammer points out:

Being the best, and representing the strongest country in the world, they automatically become prime targets. You’re a terrorist. You see three peacekeepers—a Fijian, a Canadian, and an American—riding shotgun, say, for a food shipment headed for Kabul. Whom are you going to ambush? Or, best of all, whom are you going to kidnap? If you think Osama is worth $25 million to us, think of what one American peacekeeper held hostage and tortured on videotape is worth to al-Qaeda.93

Deploying a large number of American troops in Afghanistan is also unwise because the United States needs to keep its troops available and its powder dry for whatever high-intensity contingencies may arise later. Getting bogged down in another open-ended nation-building mission like Kosovo or Bosnia would be a diversion from the real work that may still lie ahead in destroying the al-Qaeda network elsewhere. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has already noted, America’s open-ended nation-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are putting “an increasing strain on both our forces and our resources when they face growing demands from critical missions in the war on terrorism.”92

More important, the overriding strategic problem with the nation-building prescription is one of sustainability, especially if, as some people propose, Afghanistan is just the first in a string of new Kosovo- or Bosnia-style nation-building missions. During World War II the United States shipped huge numbers of soldiers and sailors around the world. But that situation was clearly meant to be temporary, and the vast majority of the American fighters came home within a few years. During the Cold War the United States forward deployed large numbers of troops to contain communism. But most were concentrated in Western Europe, Japan, and Korea.94 A campaign of global nation building à la Kosovo or Bosnia would be quite a different undertaking. It would spread the U.S. military to the four corners of the earth. Should a major war break out, those missions would compete for limited manpower and resources, and that would compromise the U.S. military’s ability to fight and win this nation’s wars, which is, after all, its raison d’être.

That is not an idle concern. Troop deployments are a lot like tax hikes—“temporary” when proposed but “permanent” when put into practice. And, as former Reagan assistant secretary of state Charles H. Fairbanks Jr. worries, overextension often happens by small steps and for the best of reasons. Maybe America can resist the imperial temptation, he says, but “the example of what happened to the Roman empire does give me cause for concern.”94

It also does not make for very good strategy. As Massachusetts Institute of Technology political scientist Barry Posen explains, “Strategy requires the establishment of priorities because resources are scarce. Resources must be ruthlessly concentrated against the main threat,” which in this case is “the extended al-Qaeda organization and the states that support it.” And since it cannot be everywhere at once,

the United States must make it clear that direct support for terrorists who try to kill large numbers of Americans is
tantamount to participation in the attack. Particularly in the age of weapons of mass destruction, the United States cannot allow any state to participate in catastrophic attacks on its homeland with impunity. More intensive defensive precautions can reduce but not eliminate U.S. vulnerability... so deterrence must be the first line of defense. For these reasons, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan had to be destroyed.  

Conclusion  

According to former president Bill Clinton, the forces behind the September 11 attacks on the United States “feed on disillusionment, poverty, and despair.” His solution: “spread prosperity and security to all.” Presidential aspirant Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) says that the next great foreign policy challenge is to promote “American values” in Muslim countries; doing so, he contends, will enhance America’s national security. Liberal internationalism, in short, is back, and this time it is posing in the realist attire of national self-interest. But its utopian premise is still the same: if only we could populate the planet with “good” states, we could eradicate international conflict and terrorism. Liberal internationalism’s latest disguise, however, extends beyond just the project of nation building and trying to spread democracy and good government. Liberal internationalists are also using September 11 to justify signing all sorts of feel-good treaties—many of which have no counterterrorism component—claiming that national self-interest requires it. For example, Lawrence Korb, director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, says that the United States must now work cooperatively on land mines and global warming. Why? Not because the proposed treaties in those areas are well-conceived or strong deterrents to terrorism—they are not—but because the tragic events of “Black Tuesday” are “a wake-up call about the dangers of a unilateralist foreign policy.” Korb’s advice: the Bush administration should “demonstrate that it is ready to stand with the world, even if it means accepting some limited constraints on America’s freedom to do as it pleases.”

Even environmentalists have jumped on the “national self-interest” bandwagon. In the wake of September 11, the president of the Waterkeeper Alliance has argued that stricter regulations on gas mileage for cars and SUVs are in the national interest because better fuel economy will not only make for cleaner air but will also reduce America’s reliance on foreign oil. “If Congress is serious about ensuring our national security,” he writes, “it should immediately pass legislation to raise fuel economy standards to 40 miles a gallon by 2012 and 55 by 2020.”

In a related claim, the president of the Worldwatch Institute, Christopher Flavin, declares, “If the lofty social and ecological goals of the [1992] Rio Earth Summit had been achieved, it is possible that the crisis of the last year would not have occurred.” And UCLA professor of physiology and public health Jared Diamond argues that “combating the forces of poverty and hopelessness on which international terrorism feeds” means that the United States should pursue “three strategies—providing basic health care, supporting family planning, and addressing such widespread environmental problems as deforestation.”

None of those suggestions, however, gets to the heart of the current terrorism problem. Large minorities in the Muslim world openly declared their support for and solidarity with the perpetrators of the September 11 terrorist attacks, and many governments of Muslim countries preferred to keep silent—including the government of Kuwait, which not only presides over a wealthy citizenry but owes its very existence today to the United States.

In the real world, combating terrorism is not tied only to choking off its funding and removing its motivations. Combating terrorism is tied to the realist perspective, which says that it increasingly makes sense for states to use or condone violence, including terrorism, if they perceive that they can get away with it—that is, when they fall prey to the idea that violence will succeed, it becomes a more commonly adopted alternative. A realist approach to combating
terrorism, therefore, does not hinge on nation building or making the world safer for democracy. It hinges on a policy of victory and credible deterrence. The point is to prevent terrorism by making its sponsors and accomplices fear the costs. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger got it right when he wrote, “Governments on whose territory terrorists are tolerated, especially in the Muslim world, ‘will find it especially difficult to cooperate [with the United States] unless the consequences of failing to do so are made more risky than their tacit bargain with the terrorists.’”

And where there is no competent government for the United States to deter? U.S. policymakers should understand that is precisely where the terrorists are at their most exposed, because there is no power to protect them. Nation building, therefore, is the wrong prescription. It is likely to create more incentives, targets, and opportunities for anti-American terrorism, not fewer.

Notes

1. Nation building can take many shapes, from full-scale occupation or establishing a UN protectorate to seizing command of a capital and installing a sympathetic government or manipulating local politics by using diplomatic pressure and financial aid.


4. Quoted in ibid., p. 4.


19. For this and other arguments for questioning the link between poverty and terrorism and poverty and crime, see Bruce Bartlett, “Misreading the Scorecard,” Washington Times, October 31, 2001, p. A20.


22. Quoted in ibid.

23. Quoted in ibid.


25. Quoted in ibid.

26. See ibid.


28. On average, developing countries face tariffs on their manufactured exports that are nearly four times the tariffs facing exports of developed countries. Because of that inequitable pattern of protectionism, Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin of the World Bank have concluded that developing countries would capture around 75 percent of the worldwide economic benefits from further trade liberalization in the manufacturing sector. See Thomas W. Hertel and Will Martin, “Would Developing Countries Gain from Inclusion of Manufactures in the WTO Negotiations?” Paper presented at the WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries, Millennium Round Secretariat Meeting, September 20–21, 1999, pp. 3, 12.


31. Ibid., p. 10.


35. See St. Denis and Cassels.


38. See Ford.


44. According to University of Illinois political scientist Richard Merritt, by the time the war was over substantial numbers of Germans “were disgusted by what the Nazis had done and increasingly realized that Nazi actions were not accidental but were consistent with and even prefigured by Nazi ideology. . . . To some measure, then, the American Military Government enjoyed a ready market for its product.” Richard L. Merritt, Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945–1949 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 394. Similarly, historian John Dower explains that, in the case of Japan, the U.S. occupying force “encountered a populace sick of war, contemptuous of the militarists who had led them to disaster, and all but overwhelmed by the difficulties of..."
their present circumstances in a ruined land." The Japanese, moreover, embraced their defeat not as an end but as the beginning of a better future. As a result, explains Dower, "The ideals of peace and democracy took root in Japan—not as a borrowed ideology or imposed vision, but as a lived experience and a seized opportunity. . . . It was an extraordinary, and extraordinarily fluid, moment—never seen before in history and, as it turned out, never to be repeated." John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: Norton, 1999), pp. 23–24, 84.

45. Quoted in Ford.


47. Even political scientist Stephen Walt contends that "the attacks of September 11 demonstrate that failed states are more than a humanitarian tragedy; they can also be a major national security problem" and that "nation building, it seems, is not such a bad idea after all." Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy," *International Security* 26, no. 3 (Winter 2001–02): 62, 69.


50. Ibid., p. 128.


54. Quoted in Bacevich.


56. Ibid.


72. Quoted in ibid.

73. For this and other arguments as to why the partition of Somalia may be the most pragmatic answer to its ongoing problems, see Austin Bay, “Somalia’s Lethal Magnetism,” Washington Times, January 13, 2002.


96. Quoted in Pipes, p. 15.


98. Realist thinker John J. Mearsheimer describes liberal internationalism as follows: “For liberals . . . there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states in the international system. Good states pursue cooperative policies and hardly ever start wars on their own, whereas bad states cause conflicts with other states and are prone to use force to get their way.” Thus, he explains, liberal internationalists believe that “the key to peace is to populate the world with good states.” John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), pp. 15-16.


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